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EPISTEMIC DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM* 
José Zalabardo, UCL 
1 Epistemic Disjunctivism 
Duncan Pritchard’s recent book (Pritchard 2012) provides a lucid articulation and defence of 
epistemological disjunctivism (ED). He offers a characteristically clear formulation of the view: 
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S, has perceptual knowledge that  
in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R, for her belief that  which is both 
factive (i.e., R’s obtaining entails ) and reflectively accessible to S. (13) 
This factive, reflectively accessible rational support that postulated by ED consists in S’s seeing that 
: 
So when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge of a proposition, p, one’s reflectively 
accessible rational support for believing that p is that one sees that p. Seeing that p is 
factive, however, in that if it is the case that one sees that p then p must be true. (14) 
By way of a declaration of interests, let me start by saying that I don’t think ED provides a 
satisfactory account of perceptual knowledge. I think that epistemological disjunctivism would be 
highly implausible unless metaphysical disjunctivism were true, but metaphysical disjunctivism is 
false. However, this point is irrelevant to the assessment of Pritchard’s contribution. He is very clear 
about what he hopes to achieve and what he doesn’t hope to achieve, and the interaction between 
epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism is one of the issues that he explicitly leaves to one 
side. 
Pritchard has two main goals concerning ED. First, he puts forward solutions to three fundamental 
problems that the view may seem to face. Second, he argues that, if ED were true, we would have at 
our disposal a satisfactory strategy for dealing with the problem of radical scepticism. Here I am 
going to concentrate on the second issue—on the promised anti-sceptical dividends of ED. I am 
going to argue that, contrary to what Pritchard claims, ED doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical 
strategy. I shall contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Pritchard puts forward is 
unsatisfactory. My argument won’t rely on my rejection of ED. I am going to argue that even if ED 
were true, the anti-sceptical strategy that Pritchard puts forward on behalf of the disjunctivist would 
have to be rejected. 
2 The sceptical problem 
Pritchard discusses a form of sceptical reasoning based on sceptical hypotheses. He concentrates on 
Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, according to which your brain has been removed from the 
body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive, and its nerve endings have been 
connected to a computer which causes you to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal 
(Putnam 1981). The form of sceptical reasoning with which Pritchard engages derives the conclusion 
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that you don’t know many of the things that you take yourself to know from two claims concerning 
the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis: first, there are many things that you take yourself to know that you 
wouldn’t know unless you knew that the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis doesn’t obtain; second, you don’t 
know that the hypothesis doesn’t obtain. The first claim is supported by the plausible principle that 
knowledge is closed under known entailment or, in Pritchard’s preferred version, under competent 
deduction. If you know that p entails q, or if you have competently deduced q from p, then you can’t 
know p unless you also know q. The knowledge claims that are threatened by the argument concern 
propositions of which you know that they entail that you are not a brain in a vat, or from which you 
can competently deduce this conclusion. Many propositions that you take yourself to know satisfy 
this condition. Take, for example, the proposition that you have hands. You know that this entails 
that you are not a brain in a vat (if you were one, you wouldn’t have hands). Hence the sceptic can 
argue as follows: 
1. You don’t know that you are not a brain in a vat. 
2. If you don’t know that you are not a brain in a vat you don’t know that you have hands. 
Therefore: 
3. You don’t know that you have hands. 
And parallel arguments can be deployed with respect to many other propositions that you take 
yourself to know. The premises of this argument logically entail the conclusion. Hence resisting the 
conclusion would require rejecting at least one of the premises. 
Rejecting the second premise was the strategy favoured by Robert Nozick (Nozick 1981). This 
allowed him to concede to the sceptic that we don’t know that we are not envatted brains while 
holding on to the everyday knowledge claims targeted by the argument. Pursuing this strategy 
requires abandoning the closure principle, but Nozick didn’t see this as a problem, as the principle is 
incompatible with his preferred analysis of knowledge. 
However, many others see the rejection of the closure principle as too high a price to pay, and are 
therefore forced to treat premise 2 of the sceptical argument as unassailable. For them (for us) 
resisting the sceptical conclusion requires rejecting premise 1. If we take this line, in order to 
vindicate your knowledge claims in the face of the sceptical challenge we need to provide an 
account of how you can know you are not a brain in a vat. 
This is the point at which Pritchard expects ED to make a contribution to the anti-sceptical cause. If 
we accept ED, Pritchard claims, we have at our disposal a satisfactory account of how we can know 
that we are not envatted brains. 
3 The evidential problem 
Pritchard presents the ED-based account of how you know that you are not a brain in a vat as an 
answer to a specific challenge to the claim that this knowledge is possible. He introduces the 
challenge in connection with Dretske’s zebra case (Dretske 1970), where closure also forces us to 
make a knowledge attribution that might seem hard to explain. Zula goes to the zoo and takes a 
good look at a zebra. Under normal circumstances, we would want to say that Zula can come to 
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know that the animal is a zebra by looking at it. But now closure poses a problem. We can assume 
that Zula knows that the proposition that the animal is a zebra entails that it isn’t a mule cleverly 
disguised by the zoo authorities to look like a zebra, or that she has competently deduced the latter 
from the former. Hence, according to closure, she won’t know that it is a zebra unless she knows 
that it isn’t a cleverly disguised mule. But the claim that Zula knows that the animal isn’t a cleverly 
disguised mule is problematic. Pritchard first raises a difficulty for this knowledge ascription based 
on the Discrimination Principle, but then argues that the difficulty is spurious, as the principle has to 
be rejected. He then raises a more enduring difficulty, to which he refers as the evidential problem: 
[…] the closure principle forces us to regard Zula as knowing that what she is looking at is not 
a cleverly disguised mule, and yet she doesn’t appear to have any good supporting evidence 
for this knowledge. Moreover, although we might not claim that all knowledge must be 
evidentially grounded, all will surely agree that knowledge of a proposition like this must be 
so grounded. (74) 
The evidential problem arises from the claim that Zula wouldn’t know that the animal is not a 
cleverly disguised mule unless she had good supporting evidence for this proposition. The problem 
consists in identifying the evidence that can play this role. 
Pritchard argues that the evidence that Zula obtains just by looking at the zebra (“evidence regarding 
the visual scene before her” (77)) won’t do the job, since this evidence “does not seem to speak at 
all to the cleverly disguised mule alternative” (75). Pritchard is certainly right about this. I think that 
the phenomenon can be fruitfully explained in terms of the notion of incremental confirmation. I 
take it that we can assume that in order to count as ‘good supporting evidence’ for a hypothesis H, a 
piece of evidence E has to provide a substantial amount of incremental confirmation for H. In order 
for E to provide any amount of incremental confirmation for H, E has to be more probable if H is true 
than if H is false. I.e. it has to be the case that p(E|H) > p(E|~H).1 In normal conditions the evidence 
that Zula obtains by looking at the animal will satisfy this condition with respect to the hypothesis 
that it is zebra. The animal is more likely to look like this if it is a zebra than if it isn’t.2 Crucially, 
however, the condition is not satisfied with respect to the hypothesis that the animal is not a 
cleverly disguised mule. The animal is not more likely to look like this if it isn’t a cleverly disguised 
mule than if it is. In fact it is more likely to look like this if it is a cleverly disguised mule than if it 
isn’t—this, after all, is what a cleverly disguised mule looks like. 
Pritchard proposes to deal with the problem by considering other evidence that Zula can be 
expected to have: 
One might reason, for instance, that there would be no point in such a deception, that it 
would be costly and time-consuming without bringing any comparable benefit, that it would 
be easily found out, and then the zoo-owner would be subject to penalties, and so on. (79)3 
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General evidence of this kind will not be afflicted by the problem that invalidates the evidence that 
Zula obtains just by looking, and can in principle be invoked to solve this instance of the evidential 
problem. 
4 The evidential problem and scepticism 
The claim that you know that you are not a brain in a vat faces another instance of the evidential 
problem. If knowing that you are not a brain in a vat requires an evidential basis, then the claim that 
you have this knowledge needs to be backed up by an account of which evidence can play this role. 
We are owed, Pritchard writes, “an explanation of the evidential basis for this anti-sceptical 
knowledge (or else an explanation of how it could feasibly lack an evidential basis)” (117). 
For the non-disjunctivist, the proposition that you are not a brain in a vat cannot inherit the requisite 
evidence from the everyday propositions by which you know it to be entailed. Take for example your 
visual evidence for the proposition that you have hands. For the non-disjunctivist, the evidence that 
you obtain by looking at your hands is the same evidence that you would have if you were a brain in 
a vat under the false impression of looking at your hands. Under normal circumstances this evidence 
can be expected to provide incremental confirmation for the proposition that you have hands. 
Things are more likely to look the way they do when you seem to look down at the ends of your 
arms if you have hands than if you don’t.4 
But this visual evidence doesn’t provide incremental confirmation for the hypothesis that you are 
not a brain in a vat. The probability that things look the way they do when you seem to be looking 
down at the ends of your arms is just as high if you are a brain in a vat as if you are normally 
embodied. The computer to which the brain’s nerve endings are connected ensures that this is so. 
So far the situation that you face with respect to the proposition that you are not a brain in a vat is 
parallel to Zula’s situation with the proposition that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule. 
However, Pritchard argues, the move that solves the evidential problem for Zula is not available to 
you. None of the evidence at your disposal will support the hypothesis that you are not a brain in a 
vat. Here is how Pritchard characterises the disanalogy: 
For example, just as we appealed to Zula’s background knowledge about the plausibility of 
the cleverly disguised mule hypothesis in order to accord her with the appropriate favouring 
evidence in support of her beliefs, suppose we appealed to similar background knowledge 
that our agent in the radical sceptical case might be thought to have in order to accord her 
with the requisite favouring evidence.5 After all, we might naturally suppose that the agent 
in the sceptical case possesses all sorts of good reasons for thinking that the BIV hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Vogel and I recommend is that Pritchard needs Zula’s knowledge that the animal is not a cleverly disguised 
mule to be supported by evidence that also supports her knowledge that the animal is a zebra. This is in order 
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is implausible (e.g., that this scenario is incompatible with the current state of technology, 
that it is not plausible that someone would have a motive to pursue such ‘envatments’, and 
so on). 
The problem, however, should now be manifest. We can unproblematically appeal to such 
background knowledge in the case of Zula precisely because the error-possibility at issue 
does not call into question this background knowledge. The same is not true when we focus 
on the radical sceptical hypothesis. For if the agent were indeed a BIV, then she would lack 
such background knowledge. Accordingly, it would be contentious to appeal to such 
evidence as a means of showing that the agent’s beliefs have the requisite epistemic 
support. (85) 
According to Pritchard, the evidential problem concerning the hypothesis that you are not a brain in 
a vat cannot be solved by appeal to the background knowledge that you think you have. This is 
because if the hypothesis were false—if you were a brain in a vat—you wouldn’t have this 
knowledge. I don’t think this is the real reason why background evidence is disqualified, but I agree 
with Pritchard that this instance of the evidential problem cannot be solved in this way. More 
generally, I believe that on a non-disjunctivist conception of perceptual knowledge, the problem has 
no solution. If ED sustained a satisfactory solution, this would have to count as a major advantage 
for the view. 
5 Disjunctivism to the rescue 
Pritchard claims that ED can solve the evidential problem. We can appreciate the change that ED 
brings about if we compare the standard construal of the Zula case with the ED-based alternative. 
On the construal of the case that we have assumed until now, the evidence that Zula obtains, just by 
looking, for the proposition that the animal is a zebra is compatible with the animal not being a 
zebra—she could have the evidence that she has even if the animal were not a zebra. But on an ED-
based construal of the case, if we think of it as a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge, that 
Zula sees that the animal is a zebra provides her with factive rational support for believing that the 
animal is a zebra. She couldn’t have the evidence that she has if the animal weren’t a zebra. This, 
according to Pritchard, makes all the difference: 
[…] because her reflectively accessible rational basis for this belief is factive this itself 
suffices to directly exclude the target error-possibility.  (125) 
Pritchard is highlighting an important difference between deductive and non-deductive evidence. As 
we have seen both in Zula’s case and with the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, if E provides adequate but 
non-deductive evidential support for H1, E might not provide adequate support for H2 even if H1 
entails H2. The way the animal looks provides adequate support for the proposition that it is a zebra, 
but not for the proposition that it isn’t a cleverly disguised mule; how things look to you when you 
seem to be looking towards the ends of your arms provides adequate support for the proposition 
that you have hands, but not for the proposition that you are not a brain in a vat. However, with 
deductive evidence this is not a possibility. If E provides deductive evidence for H1, and H1 entails 
H2, then E also provides deductive evidence for H2. On the ED-based construal of the case, Zula has  
factive perceptual evidence for the proposition that the animal is a zebra. Since this proposition 
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entails that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule, it follows that her perceptual evidence also 
provides deductive support for the latter proposition. 
Pritchard concludes from this that on the ED-based construal of the case, the evidential problem 
concerning Zula’s knowledge that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule can be solved in terms 
of her perceptual evidence. The (factive) evidence that she obtains just by looking can be invoked to 
explain the evidential basis for her knowledge that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule. 
The same situation obtains with respect to the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis. According to ED, when you 
look to the ends of your arms, you obtain factive rational support for your belief that you have 
hands—namely that you see that you have hands. Since your seeing that you have hands provides 
deductive evidence for the proposition that you have hands, and this proposition entails that you are 
not a brain in a vat, it follows that your seeing that you have hands also provides deductive evidence 
for the proposition that you are not a brain in a vat. This is how Pritchard characterises the situation 
of a subject, John, in the circumstances that I have described: 
John has reflectively available to him rational support for his belief that p which (he is fully 
aware) entails p and hence which entails not-BIV as well. (123) 
Hence, Pritchard claims, ED puts at our disposal a solution to the evidential problem with respect to 
your anti-skeptical knowledge. Your factive evidence for, say, the proposition that you have hands 
can be invoked to explain the evidential basis for your knowledge that you are not a brain in a vat.6 
6 A gap in the argument 
I’ve claimed in the previous section that Pritchard is right in endorsing the following principle: 
A. If E provides deductive evidence for H1, and H1 entails H2, then E provides deductive 
evidence for H2. 
And by virtue of this principle, ED entails: 
B. Your seeing that you have hands provides deductive evidence for the proposition that you 
are not a brain in a vat. 
If this is to amount to a solution to the evidential problem, we have to be able to conclude the 
following: 
C. Your seeing that you have hands can constitute the evidential basis for your knowledge that 
you are not a brain in a vat. 
This conclusion would be unproblematic in the presence of the following principle: 
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D. If S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then p can constitute the evidential basis for S’s 
knowledge that q. 
You know, by reflection, that you see that you have hands, and you know that your seeing that you 
have hands entails that you are not a brain in a vat. Hence, in the presence of D, C follows directly. 
I think, however, that intuition is firmly against the universal validity of D. There are cases in which S 
knows p and S knows that p entails q, but it seems intuitively wrong to say that p can constitute the 
evidential basis for S’s knowledge that q. 
We encounter intuitive counterexamples to D in the cases that we have been considering. Zula 
knows that the animal is a zebra, and she knows that this entails that it isn’t a cleverly disguised 
mule, and yet it seems intuitively wrong to say that the animal being a zebra can constitute the 
evidential basis for Zula’s knowledge that it isn’t a cleverly disguised mule. And you know that you 
have hands, and you know that this entails that you are not a brain in a vat, but once again it seems 
intuitively wrong to say that your having hands constitutes the evidential basis for your knowledge 
that you are not a brain in a vat.7 
It seems to me that the clash with intuition is undeniable.8 I realise, however, that this doesn’t 
amount to a refutation of D. We need to be open to the possibility of accepting epistemic principles 
that don’t provide a perfect match for our intuitions, and it might turn out that D provides the 
optimal account of knowledge based on deductive evidence, and that recalcitrant intuitions will have 
to be discarded as mistaken. 
Whether or not we should take this line will depend to a large extent on whether we can provide a 
plausible diagnosis of the shortcoming exhibited by the cases that intuition doesn’t want to treat as 
genuine instances of evidence-based knowledge—a necessary condition for evidence-based 
knowledge that is violated in these cases but satisfied in intuitively acceptable instances of D. At this 
point we have a wide range of options at our disposal. They can be found in the extensive recent 
literature on the transmission of warrant by inference.9 This is not the place to review these 
proposals. What I want to do is to present what I regard as the most satisfactory option, and to 
consider how it affects the anti-sceptical power of ED. 
The necessary condition for evidence-based knowledge that I want to consider derives from a 
condition imposed by Nozick on when inferring q from p yields knowledge of q: according to Nozick, 
this requires that if q were false you wouldn’t believe p (Nozick 1981: 231). If it is the case that if q 
were false you would still believe p, then even if you know p, and p supports or even entails q, and 
you know that it does, inferring q from p won’t enable you to know q. I favour a version of this 
condition formulated in terms of conditional probabilities instead of counterfactuals: what evidential 
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knowledge of a hypothesis requires is that you are more likely to believe the evidence if the 
hypothesis is true than if the hypothesis is false (Zalabardo 2012: 98). The result is a necessary 
condition for knowing q on the basis of the evidential support provided by p: 
E. S can know q on the basis of the evidential support provided by p only if S is more likely to 
believe p if q is true than if q is false.10 
This principle succeeds in ruling out the intuitively unacceptable instances of D that we have 
considered.11 Zula would be just as likely to believe that the animal she is looking at is a zebra if it 
were a cleverly disguised mule as if it were a zebra. This is what the cleverness of the disguise 
amounts to. It follows that, according to E, Zula can’t know that the animal is a cleverly disguised 
mule on the basis of the evidential support provided by her belief that it is a zebra. And you are as 
likely to believe that you have hands if you are a brain in a vat as if you are normally embodied, as it 
is an essential feature of the brain-in-a-vat scenario, as it figures in recent discussions of scepticism, 
that envatted brains have the same perceptual beliefs as their embodied counterparts.12 It follows 
that according to E, you can’t know that you are not a brain in a vat on the basis of the evidential 
support provided by your belief that you have hands. 
Furthermore, I want to claim that E is not simply extensionally correct. It’s not just that it succeeds in 
ruling out the instances of D that intuition rejects. In addition, it provides a very appealing diagnosis 
of what is wrong with these cases. The reason why we don’t want to say that Zula can know that the 
animal is not a cleverly disguised mule on the basis of the evidential support provided by her belief 
that it is a zebra is that if the animal were a cleverly disguised mule Zula would be no less likely to 
believe that it is a zebra—it wouldn’t be a zebra, but Zula would be just as likely to believe that it is 
one; and the reason why we don’t want to say that you can know  that you are not a brain in a vat 
on the basis of the evidential support provided by your belief that you have hands is that if you were 
a brain in a vat you would be just as likely to believe that you have hands—you wouldn’t have hands, 
but you would be just as likely to believe that you do.13 
Let’s consider now how E bears on the ED-based solution to the evidential problem. Consider Zula 
first. In order to determine whether the proposal complies with E, we need to ask the following 
question: would Zula be less likely to believe that she sees that the animal she’s looking at is a zebra 
if it were a cleverly disguised mule than she would be if it were an actual zebra? And concerning 
your knowledge that you are not a brain in a vat we need to ask: would you be less likely to believe 
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that you see that you have hands if you were a brain in a vat than you would be if you were normally 
embodied? If we answer these questions in the affirmative, we’ll have to conclude that the ED-based 
solution to the evidential problem is incompatible with E. Hence if E is correct, as I think it is, the ED-
based solution to the evidential problem will have to be rejected. 
I think that these questions have to be answered in the affirmative. I take this to be a direct 
consequence of the introspective indistinguishability of paradigmatic cases perceptual knowledge, in 
which, according to ED, you have factive reasons, and parallel scenarios in which you lack factive 
reasons but you continue to blamelessly suppose that you possess them. Pritchard thinks that this 
point is “an undeniable truth” (20). I agree. If we characterise Zula’s case in these terms, we’ll have 
to say that if the animal she is looking at were a cleverly disguised mule, Zula would be just as likely 
to believe (falsely, in this case) that she sees that the animal is a zebra. Hence our question 
concerning Zula has to receive an affirmative answer. It follows that the ED-based solution to this 
instance of the evidential problem is incompatible with E. And if we apply this template to the brain-
in-a-vat case, we will have to say that if you were a brain in a vat, you would be just as likely to 
believe (falsely, in this case) that you see that you have hands. Hence our question, again, has to 
receive an affirmative answer. It follows that the ED-based solution to this instance of the evidential 
problem is also incompatible with E. 
7 Conclusion 
I have argued that Pritchard’s ED-based solution to the evidential problem is incompatible with the 
principle (E) that knowing q on the basis of evidence provided by p requires that you are more likely 
to believe p if q is true than if q is false. I think that the principle is correct, and that Pritchard’s 
solution will have to be rejected on these grounds, but I haven’t provided an adequate defence of 
the principle, so I cannot claim to have established that Pritchard’s solution is unsatisfactory. 
Notice, however, that the anti-sceptical power of ED cannot be saved by upholding the universal 
applicability of D. If D is universally applicable, and ED is correct, then you can know that you are not 
a brain in a vat on the basis of the evidence provided by your seeing that you have hands. Hence, in 
the presence of D, ED would sustain a satisfactory solution to the evidential problem. However, if D 
is universally applicable, we will have a satisfactory solution to the evidential problem even if we 
reject ED. As we have seen, it follows from D that you can know that you are not a brain in a vat on 
the basis of the evidence provided by your having hands, independently of how we construe your 
evidence for your belief that you have hands. 
In sum, if, on the one hand, E is true, Pritchard’s ED-based solution to the evidential problem is 
incorrect. If, on the other hand, D is universally valid, then Pritchard’s ED-based solution to the 
evidential problem is redundant. The solution will only be relevant and correct if the validity of D is 
restricted by a principle other than E—one that rules out your having hands, but not your seeing that 
you have hands, as a suitable evidential basis for your knowledge that you are not a brain in a vat. A 
vindication of Pritchard’s solution will have to be based on a principle with these features. 
In section 4 I expressed my agreement with Pritchard’s claim that if ED is not the right account of 
perceptual knowledge, then the evidential problem for anti-sceptical knowledge cannot be solved, 
either in terms of perceptual evidence or by reference to background knowledge. Now I’m claiming, 
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although I haven’t quite shown this, that endorsing ED won’t give us a solution to the evidential 
problem either. 
It may seem that this outcome would make scepticism unavoidable. If the evidential problem can’t 
be solved, the thought would go, then the first premise of the sceptical argument is correct: you 
don’t know that you are not a brain in a vat, and if, as I’ve also claimed, the second premise is also 
unassailable, we seem to be left with no option but to accept the conclusion that you don’t know 
that you have hands. 
I want to close by pointing out a gap in this line of reasoning. I am claiming that, with or without ED, 
we won’t be able to find a suitable evidential basis for your knowledge that you are not a brain in a 
vat. This is a problem, however, only on the assumption that this knowledge needs an evidential 
basis. If we could provide a non-evidential account of how you know you are not a brain in a vat, we 
would be able to reject the first premise of the sceptical argument even if the evidential problem 
had no solution.14 This, I submit, is the best way forward. 
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